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INTRODUCTION
The process of crafting and promulgating technical standards for the Internet
is often hailed as a prime example of how coordinated activity can take place on
a distributed network with little central authority or formal "law."' Groups of
interested engineers and computer scientists form working groups to study
particular Internet technical problems. Participation in these groups is generally
open. The engineers and computer scientists reach consensus on a particular
t © 1999 Joseph P. Liu
* Climenko Teaching Fellow, Harvard Law School. J.D., Columbia Law School; B.A.,
Yale College. Thanks to Karl Auerbach, Richard Fallon, Allen Ferrell, Tamar Frankel, Larry
Lessig, Marc Spindelman, and Jonathan Zittrain for helpful comments and suggestions. All
errors are mine alone.
1. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?:
A Meditation on the Relative Virtues ofDecentralized, Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE
INTERNET 62, 62, 68-69 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997).
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standard and, after review by other groups of engineers, publish the standard on
the Internet. The standards are then voluntarily adopted by the Internet as a
whole. This coordination takes place, across millions of computers around the
world, without any formal legal structure. The working groups have no formal or
legal authority to set Internet standards; nothing requires the computers on the
Internet to follow these standards. Nevertheless, the standard-setting process has
served to coordinate orderly development of Internet technical standards for the
past ten years. The success of this open and consensus-based process has led
some observers to believe that nontechnical issues, such as regulation of fraud
and crime on the Internet, may be resolved through analogous forms of
"decentralized, emergent law."2
Often overlooked, however, is the fact that the Internet's technical standard-
setting process rests on a number of highly contingent assumptions. One
fundamental assumption is that consensus is achievable. It is easy to see how this
assumption might hold true in the realm of technical standards. The Internet's
technical standards are created and adopted by a relatively small community of
engineers and programmers. Such a community can be expected to share a certain
set of common professional norms and values, at least as compared to the public
as a whole. In addition, the technical nature of the standards means that relatively
objective factors can be employed to measure the desirability of a particular
standard. Consensus under such conditions may be much easier to achieve.
Moreover, the coordination of technical standards may not solely be the result of
consensus; other factors, such as simple adherence to custom or the lack of any
viable alternatives, may also contribute to the orderly development and adoption
of technical standards.
The conditions that make possible the existing consensus-based process of
standards coordination may not exist in other areas of Internet governance.
Broader questions of Internet policy implicate the interests of individuals and
entities outside the relatively small community of engineers and computer
scientists. As the universe of individuals and entities expands, the set of values
and norms similarly expands. Consensus is far more difficult, if not impossible,
to achieve when the stakeholders include not only engineers but also commercial
interests and the public at large. Moreover, general policy questions, such as
acceptable standards of behavior on the Internet, are not as subject to objective
measures and may, in fact, involve highly contested value judgments. Where such
value judgments are at issue, the existing, consensus-based process for technical
standard-setting may be inadequate to deal with the particular problem. Although
much praise has generally been given to the decentralized and self-governing
2. Id. at 68.
We will argue that the same decentralized decision-making process that created
the Internet at a technical level may be able to create a workable and, indeed,
empowering and just form of order even at the highest level of the protocol
stack-the realm of rules applicable to the collective social evaluation and
governance of human behavior.
Id. Note that the groups that are responsible for technical standard-setting have by-and-large
made no such claims.
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aspects of Internet coordination, far less attention has been paid to the possible
limits of the process.
In this Article, I wish to explore the limits of the existing standard-setting
model of Internet coordination, using the Internet domain name controversy as
a case study. Internet domain names, such as "nike.com" or "harvard.edu," are the
text-based addresses of the Internet. Used initially as convenient mnemonics by
the engineers who created the Internet, domain names have since come to signify
much more, as commercial interests have come to recognize their value as
trademarks. Largely unbeknownst to the general public, a heated debate has
arisen over the past several years regarding the proper distribution of domain
names and the authority over such distribution. As the Internet has grown in scale,
it has become increasingly clear that the largely informal mechanisms that had
governed domain name distribution during the Internet's early years were
becoming increasingly ill-suited to the task. Various parties have accordingly
floated proposals for significantly reforming the existing domain name system
and its administration, and one of these proposals is currently in the process of
being implemented.
I will argue that these attempts to reform the system improperly rely, either
explicitly or implicitly, on the technical standard-setting model of coordination.
That is, to one extent or another, they attempt to resolve the domain name
problem through some version of the dominant, existing method of Internet
coordination. These proposals fail, however, to fully appreciate the fact that
domain name problems are not purely, or even primarily, technical in nature.
Rather, they are classic public policy questions, requiring the resolution of
conflicting distributional and value claims. The public policy aspect of the
domain name problem undercuts many of the assumptions that underlie the
standard-setting model of coordination. The result is that attempts to use the
current standard-setting process face serious legitimacy and implementation
problems. Although more recent attempts to reform the system are beginning to
recognize the limits of the standard-setting process, they do not go far enough.
I begin in Part I with a brief overview of how the domain name system works.
In Part II, I outline the technical standard-setting model of Internet coordination
and analyze the assumptions underlying that model. I also demonstrate how
existing attempts at reforming the domain name system rely either implicitly or
explicitly on the standard-setting model. In Part III, I argue that problems with
the domain name system are in fact not primarily technical, but rather questions
of public policy, and in Part IV, I analyze how this undercuts the assumptions
underlying the standard-setting model. In Part V, I explore a number of
alternatives to the current standard-setting model and conclude that some minimal
level of government coordination may be necessary in order to ensure that the
domain name system is administered in a legitimate3 fashion. I then conclude with
3. What I mean by "legitimate" will be fleshed out in more detail below. For present
purposes, however, a process will be considered more legitimate to the extent that it seeks to
take into account the interests of all of the various parties that have a stake in the issue to be
decided by that process.
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some cautionary thoughts about the application and extension of the consensus-
based model of Internet coordination to other Internet problems.4
I. A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM
AND CURRENT PROBLEMS
Let us begin with a quick overview of how the domain name system works.' A
domain name, by itself, is not sufficient to tell your computer where and how to
find a particular computer on the Internet. To do that, your computer must
translate the domain name into its corresponding numerical Internet Protocol
("IP") address. Each computer on the Internet has a unique 32-bit IP address,
which takes the form of four groups of numbers separated by dots (e.g.,
128.103.200.10).6 The IP address tells your computer specifically where and how
to find the computer you are seeking. Thus, when you type in "law.harvard.edu"
into your browser or e-mail software, the first thing it needs to do is look up the
corresponding IP address. To do this, it sends out a query into the Internet.7
No single computer on the Internet authoritatively tracks the IP addresses for
all of the domain names on the Internet. Because such a database would be very
large and difficult to keep current, the domain name database is held in a
distributed and hierarchical fashion among numerous computers across the
Internet. At the top of the hierarchy is a computer that holds the root directory,8
4. Although a number of articles have discussed issues of Internet governance in general,
only a few have taken a sustained, close look at the issue from the perspective of the existing
standard-setting model that provides the baseline for Internet coordination. See Henry H.
Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?,
12 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 413, 443 (1997); I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for
"Cyberspace," 55 U. Prir. L. REV. 993 (1994); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Lawrence Lessig,
The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Path of Cyberlaw];
Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig,
Zones of Cyberspace]. But see David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on
Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3, I, available at <http://warthog.cc
.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/post.html>; Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-
Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911 (1996).
5. See generally Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet (last modified Feb.
20, 1998) <http://www.isoc.org/internet-history/brief.html>.
6. See P. Mockapetris, RFC 1034: Domain Names-Concepts and Facilities (Nov. 1987)
12 (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <ftp:llftp.is.co.za/rfc/rfcl034.txt>; J. Postel, RFC 1591: Domain
Name System Structure andDelegation (Mar. 1994) (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http'J/www.isi.edu/
in-notes/rfcl591.txt>. See generally Internet Requests for Comments (last modified July 22,
1998) <http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/hypertext/information/rfc.html> (listing "Requests for
Comments" or "RFCs"). Note that a domain name does not always map to an IP address-it can
also map to other types of records. In addition, your internet service provider may assign you
a different IP address each time you log on.
7. See Mockapetris, supra note 6, at 5; Postel, supra note 6.
8. There are in fact 12 copies of the root directory, which all refer to a single "A" root
directory. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,742
(1998), available at<http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahomedomainname/6_5_98dns.htm> (visited
Nov. 11, 1998) (commonly known as the "White Paper").
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which contains a list of authoritative computers for all of the top-level domains,
both geographic (e.g., .uk, .de, .us, .jp) and generic (.com, .gov, .edu).9 These
computers, in turn, contain lists of the computers that are authoritative for the
second-level domains (e.g., mcdonalds.com, harvard.edu) within each top-level
domain, and so on. The value of this distributed approach is that it allows address
changes to be made at the most local level, and therefore obviates the need for
any huge, centralized administrative body to keep track of such changes."0
Thus, using "law.harvard.edu" as an example, your computer would query the
computer holding the root directory, which would tell your computer the address
of the computer on the Internet that authoritatively lists all domain name
addresses within the ".edu" top-level domain. That computer would, in turn, be
able to tell your computer the address of the computer that authoritatively lists
domains within the "harvard.edu" second-level domain, and so on, until your
computer finds the desired IP address. In practice, not all of these steps may be
necessary, as computers on the Internet routinely store or "cache," for a limited
period of time, addresses that they have looked up relatively recently. Thus, in
our example, your Internet service provider probably already knows the IP
address for the top-level ".edu" domain, and possibly for the "harvard.edu"
second level domain.
The parties that control the computers with authoritative information at each
level of the domain name hierarchy have de facto control over the coordination
and registration of domains in that level of the hierarchy. For example, the root
directory was for a long time practically controlled by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority ("IANA"), a division of the Information Sciences Institute at
the University of Southern California, managed by a computer scientist named
Jon Postel." When a particular country wished to register for a geographic top-
level domain, IANA issued to that country a two-letter country code (e.g., .uk,
.de) and changed the root directory to include the new domain along with the IP
address of the computer that had authority over that domain. 2 Similarly, the
addition of new generic top-level domains required implementation through
9. See Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8826 (1998), available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahomeldomainname/dnsdrft.htm>
(visited Jan. 27, 1999) (commonly known as the "Green Paper"); Leiner et al., supra note 5.
10. See Mockapetris, supra note 6, at 5, 6.
11. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,741; Alexander
Gigante, Blackhole in Cyberspace: The Legal Void in the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
CoMPTER & INFO. L. 413, 416 (1997); see also Josh A. Goldfoot, Note, Antitrust Implications
of Internet Administration, 84 VA. L. REV. 909, 913 (1998).
Postel, a well-regarded and highly respected member of the Internet engineering community,
passed away unexpectedly on October 16, 1998, shortly after initiating the latest proposal for
reforming the domain name system. See A Tribute to Jon Postel, Director of the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (ANA) (last modified Oct. 29, 1998) <http://www.iana.org>;
James Glave, Net Mourns Passing of Giant (last modified Oct. 18, 1998) <http://www.wired
.com/news/news/culture/story/15682.html>. For a discussion of Postel's reform proposal, see
infra text accompanying notes 78-84.
12. The entity that controlled that computer would then have the authority to distribute
second-level domains within that top-level domain.
1999]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
IANA. 13 IANA thus coordinated and maintained the issuance of the top-level
domains, making sure that there were no conflicts. Authority over the root
directory has since been transferred from IANA to the newly-created Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), as part of the most
recent effort to reform the domain name system, which will be discussed in more
detail below. 4 .
Similarly, Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") administers the databases that
contain authoritative information regarding domains within a number of the most
important generic top-level domains, such as ".com," ".org," and ".net." Thus, if
a company wishes to register a second-level domain within the ".com" top-level
domain (e.g., burger.com), the company must go to NSI and ask for that domain. 5
If that second-level domain has not yet been taken, NSI will register that second-
level domain and list both the domain name and the corresponding IP address in
its database. (NSI issues domain names on a first-come, first-served basis, with
some special provisions for dealing with trademark issues.' 6) The company with
burger.com can then allocate domains within that second-level domain, as it
wishes.
Both IANA and NSI originally derived their authority to coordinate domain
names ostensibly from the U.S. National Science Foundation ("NSF"). The NSF
played a significant role in the initial funding and development of the Internet,
and in fact constructed the first high-speed "backbone" connecting various
regional networks. 7 The NSF was also responsible for opening up the Internet to
commercial interests and the general public.' The NSF originally delegated the
authority to administer the root directory to IANA, 9 and contracted with NSI and
AT&T (collectively known as "InterNIC") to provide administration and
registration services for a number of the generic top-level domains." It was thus
13. Although the root directory was ostensibly controlled by LANA, it was (and is)
physically maintained on computers operated by Network Solutions, Inc. See Management of
Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31, 742. Some doubt existed, however, over
what precisely would have happened if NSI had refused to follow an instruction from LANA.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
15. As of the date of this writing, ICANN is in the midst of considering how to open up the
registration function to multiple registrars, as part of the most recent plan to reform the domain
name system, which will be discussed in more detail below. See Joanna Glasner, ICANN to
Unveil New Rules (visited Feb. 2, 1999) <http://wired.com/news/news/politics/story/
17563.html>; see also infra text accompanying notes 78-80.
16. See Carl Oppedahl, Trademark Disputes in the Assignment of Domain Names, in
COORDINATING THE INTERNET, supra note 1, at 154, 160-66.
17. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742; NICHOLAS
BARAN, INSIDE THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 39-40 (1995).
18. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 414.
19. See V. Cerf, RFC 1174: IAB Recommended Policy on Distributing Internet Identifier
Assignment and IAB Recommended Policy Change to Internet "Connected" Status 2 (last
modified Aug. 1990) <http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbinlrfc/rfcl 174.html>.
20. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742; NSF
Cooperative Agreement, art. 2, pt. A.1 (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://rs.internic.net/nsf/
agreement/agreement.html>.
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through its contract with the NSF that NSI originally obtained authority to
allocate domain names within those generic top-level domains.
It is important to note that the NSF's own authority over domain name
administration, and accordingly the authority of the various entities to whom it
delegated such authority, was largely de facto.2 No formal legal strictures (e.g.,
statutes, regulations, or contracts) required computers on the Internet to accept
their databases as authoritative.22 Theoretically, all of the computers on the
Internet could have decided, and could today decide, to accept as authoritative the
version of the root directory held by another party and point their browsers or
other software programs to an alternate server.23 Indeed, at least one individual,
Eugene Kashpureff, has attempted (with limited success) to set up a competing
registry, with a competing root server.24 This other party would then have de facto
authority to issue additional top-level domains. In practice, however, such a result
is unlikely, as widespread coordination of millions of computers would be
extremely difficult.' The important point is that the authority of IANA and NSI
over domain name allocation and administration was largely a matter of custom
and historical contingency; it was not based on any identifiable legal claim of
right.26
As the Internet has grown, and as more and more commercial interests and
members of the general public have come onto the Internet, dissatisfaction has
grown with various aspects of the domain name system, and the largely informal
mechanisms that had up until recently governed the domain name system have
21. See Sharon Eisner Gillett & Mitchell Kapor, The Self-Governing Internet: Coordination
by Design, in COORDINATINGTHEINTERNEr, supra note 1, at 3, 22 (LANA's "performance of
this function is a product of history, not design. [Jon] Postel picked up the role of number
coordinator because it needed to be done when he was a graduate student involved in the birth
of the [Advanced Research Projects Agency Network ("ARPANET")], and he never quit doing
it."); Robert Shaw, Internet Domain Names: Whose Domain is This?, in COORDINATING THE
INTERNEr, supra note 1, at 107, 120-23 (unsuccessfully attempting to trace the formal authority
supporting IANA).
22. See Johnson & Post, supra note 1, at 64 ("[D]omain name look up tables function
because local hosts point their domain name servers at these tables; a form of custom, not law,
dictates the particular root servers to which local hosts point for this information.").
23. See David R. Johnson, The Price of Netizenship (last modified Nov. 12, 1996)
<http://www.cli.org/pon.html> ("[I]n theory at least, anyone anywhere in the world can ... set
up a 'registry' and associated lookup tables that map domain names to IP addresses.").
24. See AlterNic Index (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://altemic.net>; David Hakala & Jack
Rickard, A Domain by Any Other Name! (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://boardwatch.
intemet.com/mag/96/oct/bwm9.htm>.
25. Moreover, a partially successful effort would result only in a splintering and
fragmenting of the Internet.
26. Sometimes the question of who controls the root server is asked in the form: who
"owns" domain name space? This formulation is less than helpful. It assumes that domain name
space is a form of property subject to "ownership" by some entity. The description above
should make it clear that no one "owns" domain name space since no one has the universally
recognized legal authority to control the various domain name servers. Rather, control over the
root server is de facto. No legal obligations require Internet hosts to consider the root server
as authoritative. Indeed, the key characteristic of the entire domain name system is that it is
largely legally voluntary; there exist few lines of binding legal authority.
1999]
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come under increasing scrutiny. Although these problems will be discussed in
more detail below, it is worth quickly mentioning them here. First, the domain
name registration system has come into increasing conflict with trademark law.
Numerous lawsuits have been filed by trademark holders against parties who have
registered domain names corresponding to their trademarks.27 These suits have
led some to question the current allocation process and, indeed, the current
structure of domain names themselves.28 Second, the trademark conflicts noted
above, and the corresponding proposals to reform the system, have highlighted
the lack of clear authority regarding control of the domain name system and, in
particular, control of the ".com" domain, which has become (literally) the default
domain for commercial entities on the Internet.29 NSI's de facto monopoly over
the registration of the most desirable top-level domains and its particular policies
have generated much concern.
Even. more worrisome have been concerns about the future governance and
stability of the domain name system. The contract between the NSF and NSI was
scheduled to expire on September 30, 1998. Prior to its expiration, the NSF
announced its intention not to renew the contract and to withdraw from domain
name coordination altogether.3" The resulting vacuum in authority created
substantial uncertainty over what would happen after the expiration date. NSI
claimed that it possessed continuing authority to register domain names, while
other interested parties sought to reform the existing domain name system to
address some of the concerns mentioned above.3 In the end, government
intervention and an extension of the contract by the NSF forestalled any crisis in
the domain name system and ensured some continuing stability and coordination
of the domain name system while enabling further discussions of the matter.32
However, lingering questions of authority and legitimacy remain to be resolved.
The domain name system is thus presented with a number of challenges, both
short-term and long-term. Some challenges involve conflicts between existing
practices and specific bodies of law, such as trademark. Other challenges involve
more fundamental questions about the continuing administration and future shape
of the domain name system as a whole. The main question that this Article is
interested in asking is whether the existing processes of Internet governance and
coordination, which have up to now have coordinated the Internet with little
central governance, are up to the task of meeting these challenges.
27. See infra notes 87-88.
28. Others have expressed dissatisfaction with NSI's efforts at resolving domain name and
trademark conflicts. See Hakala & Rickard, supra note 24.
29. The most recent versions of Netscape automatically place a ".com" after a text string
entered into the address box, if that string is missing a generic top-level domain. See Oppedahl,
supra note 16, at 156, 169-71 (discussing the importance of a ".com" address for commercial
entities).
30. See infra text accompanying note 106.
31. See infra text accompanying note 107.
32. See Niall McKay, Network Solutions Hangs On (last modified Oct. 6, 1998) <http:ll
www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/1 5453.html>.
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II. THE STANDARD-SETTING MODEL OF COORDINATION
The coordination of the current domain name system is an example of the
general technical standard-setting model used to coordinate the Internet as a
whole. This model is based very much on consensus and a deference to expertise.
Groups of computer scientists, engineers, and programmers gather to discuss
various technical issues. Rough consensus is reached on a particular technical
standard, which is published on the Internet. Once published and shown to work,
technical standards are then voluntarily adopted by those connected to the
Internet. Underlying this process are a number of key assumptions regarding the
character of technical standards. Many proposals for reforming the domain name
system rely, explicitly or implicitly, on some version of this standard-setting
model of coordination.
A. The Standard-Setting Process and Sources of
Coordination
The Internet's technical standards are set through a process that bears a
surprising resemblance to the low-tech ideal of the New England town meeting.
The body with de facto responsibility for setting Internet standards is the Internet
Engineering Task Force ("IETF")," which is composed primarily of computer
scientists, programmers, and engineers.34 The IETF holds open meetings three
times per year, at which various parties are permitted to comment on numerous
issues surrounding Internet technical standards." After these meetings, working
groups within the IETF consider the various comments and come to consensus
around a particular technical standard. These standards are then approved by the
33. Other committees also play a role in the standard-setting process. The Internet
Architecture Board ("IAB"), another related group of computer scientists and engineers,
develops general guidelines for Internet research. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 417. The
Internet Research Task Force ("IRTF") focuses on longer-range engineering problems faced
by the Internet. See id. The Internet Society ("ISOC") is a nonprofit corporation founded in
1992 composed of various companies, agencies, and individuals involved in Internet industries.
See id. The ISOC is generally considered the most likely candidate for overall Internet
governing body and provides the formal legal umbrella for many of these other bodies. See,
e.g., E. Krol & E. Hoffman, RFC 1462: FYI on "What is the Internet?" 4 (last updated May,
1993) <http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbin/rfc/rfcl462.html>. Still other bodies play a role in
standard-setting. The IETF, however, is the main body with the primary responsibility for
drafting and issuing Internet technical standards.
34. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 417; R. Hovey & S. Bradner, RFC 2028: The
Organizations Involved in the IETF Standards Process 1 (last modified Oct. 1996)
<http'//www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbin/rfc/rfc2028.html>. Membership in the IETF is generally
open to computer engineers "with reasonable credentials." David W. Maher, Trademarks on
the Internet: Who's in Charge? (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.aldea.com/cix/
maher.html>.
35. See, e.g., Hovey & Bradner, supra note 34, at 2.
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Internet Architectural Board ("IAB")36 and then published on the Internet in the
form of a Request for Comment ("RFC").37
The standards are then adopted and implemented voluntarily38 by the wider
Internet community.39 The central and salient fact about the Internet coordination
process is that no central body has the de jure authority to mandate adoption of
the standards published in the RFCs.4' The Internet is a network with distributed
intelligence. Because no single computer controls the Internet, the adoption of a
given standard cannot be made at a single locus but, instead, must be adopted in
a distributed fashion by all of the computers on the Internet. The miraculous part
is that this occurs without any formal mandate or legal obligation.4' With a
surprising degree of noncentralized coordination, the standards are voluntarily
adopted by thousands of system operators all throughout the Internet. 42
A number of factors contribute to the widespread adoption of such standards.
First, custom plays a large role. Technical standards have historically been
adopted and propagated in this fashion. This is the Internet's way of coordinating
such standards. Second, deference to expertise also plays a role. The IETF, which
includes a number of founders of the Internet, commands a degree of respect
within the Internet community. There is a general belief that the standards crafted
by the IETF are objectively good standards, worth adopting. Moreover, the IETF
is widely assumed to have no other agenda than to look out for the best interests
of the Internet. Finally, network effects may also serve to bind individuals to
continuing adherence to this process and custom. As more parties adopt a given
standard, the value of that standard increases. Conversely, leaving that standard
entails greater and greater cost. The existing custom of technical coordination
36. See supra note 33.
37. See Shaw, supra note 21, at 114-15, for a useful chart listing the main Internet
governing bodies. See also Leiner et al., supra note 5.
38. But see infra text accompanying notes 118-19.
39. This is a simplified version of the process, though accurate for our purposes. In
practice, technical standards may gain increasing acceptance over time, as they are shown to
work. Other technical standards may be optional (e.g., providing a different way to do the
same thing) and, accordingly, may not be adopted by all.
40. Indeed, protocol standards could, in theory, be developed by other bodies and, if
accepted by the Internet community as a whole, become standard. See Gillett & Kapor, supra
note 21, at 20 ("[N]othing stops companies from inventing their own protocols and attempting
to turn them into universal standards through marketing genius, instead of through the IETF
(at least initially).") (parenthetical in original).
41. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 832 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("No single entity-
academic, corporate, governmental, or non-profit-administers the Internet. It exists and
functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands of separate operators of computers
and computer networks independently decided to use common data transfer profocols to
exchange communications and information with other computers .... "), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997).
42. See Johnson, supra note 23 (characterizing the relationships between the various
entities as a series of informal contracts).
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gives rise to a powerful network externality.43 Those who fail to adopt a standard
widely adopted by others will effectively be severed from the Internet.
Even though the adoption of standards is distributed and no centralized control
exists, some minimal degree of centralized coordination is necessary to maintain
certain aspects of the protocol.' For example, the Internet protocol requires that
all computers be aware of certain common parameters and values, in order to be
able to communicate with each other.45 In order to ensure that the parameters and
values are consistent, there must be some source on the Internet that contains the
authoritative parameters and values so that when disputes arise, reference can be
made to an authoritative source. Similarly, some central body must be trusted
with coordination of Internet addresses. Because each Internet address is unique,
some central repository must allocate Internet addresses and keep track of them
in order to prevent conflicts.
Such minimal coordination functions are vested in certain trusted bodies,46 and
their authority is largely de facto. For example, IANA was for a long time
responsible for many of the coordination functions.4 7 Among other tasks, it
managed the allocation of various Internet protocol parameters, it allocated
blocks of numerical IP addresses to regional registries (which in turn allocated
them to Internet service providers)," and it also maintained the root directory for
the domain name system, which contains the authoritative sources for the top-
level domains.49 The authority wielded by such coordinating bodies is largely de
facto, rather than de jure. Nothing legally requires Internet computers to refer to
43. See generally ROBERT MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 846-47 (1997) (general discussion of network effects); Mark A. Lemley
& David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479
(1998) (same); . Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of
Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 283 (1996) (same); J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis,
Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 133, 147
(same); Brian W. Arthur, Positive Feedback in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 92, 93
(same); Joseph Farrell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 41
(1989) (same); Paul David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 332
(1985) (same); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation,
16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985) (same); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities,
Competition and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 435 (1985) (same).
44. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 18-28 (analyzing the coordination of the "1
percent" needed to make the Internet work).
45. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741; 31,742
(1998).
46. See Don Mitchell et al., In Whose Domain?: Name Service in Adolescence, in
COORDINATING THE INTERNET, supra note 1, at 258, 259-61.
47. These tasks have since been transferred to ICANN. See infra text accompanying notes
74-83.
48. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 21-23. These regional Internet registries ("RIRs")
are Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre ("RIPE NCC"), for European Internet
Service Providers ("ISPs"); Asia Pacific Network Information Center ("APNIC"), for Asian-
Pacific ISPs; and InterNIC for any other place in the world. Both RIPE NCC and APNIC are
operated and funded by a consortia of Internet connectivity providers. See id. at 22-23.
InterNIC is discussed supra text accompanying note 20.
49. See Cerf, supra note 19, at 1.
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these sources for authoritative information. Yet strong network effects essentially
bind Internet participants to these authorities.
B. Assumptions Underlying the Standard-Setting Model
The standard-setting process described above relies, for its success, upon a
number of unstated and closely related assumptions, both about the nature of
technical standards and the identity of those who have an interest in such
standards. For the past several years, these assumptions have by and large held
true, and technical standard-setting has progressed in a relatively coordinated
manner, with little central control or direct assertion of authority. This process,
however, is coming under increasing pressure as the Internet is opened up to a
wider and wider population, as more interested parties wish to participate in the
standard-setting process, and as the stakes increase. The extent to which these
assumptions hold true in the future will determine the continuing success of this
model of Internet coordination.
Foremost among these assumptions is a belief in the possibility of "rough
consensus" in arriving at technical standards. The phrase "rough consensus and
running code" was coined by David Clark of MIT, one of the original "founders"
of the Internet, and it aptly captures the philosophy behind the current standard-
setting process.50 Under this view, no central authority is necessary if rough
consensus among the relevant stakeholders can be achieved around a working
standard. Once such consensus is achieved, the standard can be propagated
throughout the Internet. Consensus, of even the rough variety, can thus lead to
coordinated activity without any central authority ("kings" and "presidents," in
Clark's formulation).
The belief in the possibility of a "rough consensus" is itself, however,
dependent upon a number of specific, and contingent, circumstances. Consensus
is more commonly achieved among relatively small communities with shared
values." The engineers comprising the IETF are such a community. The broader
population of system administrators affected by the standards is also part of the
same community. Although differences may exist among the engineers, these
differences exist within a larger set of norms of the engineering community as a
whole. Among these norms is a recognition of and respect for technical
expertise. 2 Rough consensus is also more easily achieved when the relevant
50. The full credo reads: "We reject Kings, Presidents, and Voting: We believe in rough
consensus and a running code." Transcript of Dialogue Between J. Zittrain and D. Clark- On
the Issue of Domain Names... (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://cyber.harvard.edu/fallsem97/
trans/clark/> [hereinafter Dialogue].
51. Cf ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrrHoUT LAW: How NEiGHBORS SF'r=E DIsPuTEs
167 (1991) (stating that "members of tight social groups will informally encourage each other
to engage in cooperative behavior").
52. See Mitchell et al., supra note 46, at 258 ("The Internet grew from a small research
experiment to the huge global enterprise it is today in a relatively closed and protected
environment whose cultural ethics were based on cooperation and collegiality .... "). Indeed,
the respect for, and deference to, expertise may play a significant role in quelling dissenting
views.
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metrics are relatively technical and objective in nature. Technical standards, after
all, are meant to be implemented. Accordingly, they can be measured for
performance.53 Coordination of technical standards (such as whether addresses
should be 16-bit or 32-bit) involves fewer of the value judgments that generally
attend nontechnical policy issues.
Coordination is also made possible through an implicit recognition by others
that the existing process is a legitimate one. Members of the Internet community
recognize the legitimacy of the IETF's pronouncements not only because they
come from a respected source, but also because of a sense that the IETF does an
adequate job of speaking for the relevant interested parties, in this case primarily
the operators of systems connected to the Internet, who are directly affected by
the standards. Even if a particular computer programmer disagrees with the
particular implementation of a standard, there is a sense that relevant viewpoints
have been considered and the relevant stakeholders have had a chance to voice
their opinions.
This type of technical coordination is only possible if there exist trusted
institutions to take care of the minimal coordinating functions. The coordination
of purely technical standards is largely administrative. The control of certain
parameter lists and values, while certainly requiring judgment, does not implicate
any large degree of value judgment.54 Judgment exercised in this coordinating
function can generally be measured against a performance metric. And
historically, such judgment has been entrusted by the IETF to "one of their own,"
who has garnered the respect of the community for being objective and fair
minded-in this case, for example, Jon Postel. 5
Finally, the perceived legitimacy of the various coordinating institutions may
also be a function, to an underappreciated extent, of a background government
presence. The government, through the Department of Defense's Advanced
Research Projects Agency ("DARPA") and the NSF, played a significant role in
the initial funding and development of the Internet and plays a continuing role in
the funding of various parties.56 The background involvement of the government
may in fact play a part in the perceived legitimacy of these institutions by
providing a background, public-interest check. To the extent this is true,
coordination of Internet standards through such institutions may not be as
"private" as commonly believed.
53. Indeed, the extent to which a given standard is adopted is often a function of the extent
to which it is shown to work in practice.
54. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 22 ("Assigning [protocol parameters] takes more
effort to discuss than to do .... ).
55. See William A. Foster, Registering the Domain Name System: An Exercise in Global
Decision-Making, in COORDINATING THE INTERNET, supra note 1, at 194, 198 ("John [sic]
Postel has a long history of making technically sound decisions that have worked for the IETF,
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and users of the Internet It is this history that has given
IANA its authority."); Shaw, supra note 21, at 120 ("There is little doubt that a sagacious
LANA has played an important role in consolidating the stability of the Internet.").
56. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,741-42
(1998) ("Mhe U.S. government has played a pivotal role in creating the Internet as we know
it today.").
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C. Domain Name Proposals: The Standard-Setting Model
Many proposals for reforming the domain name system have essentially
adopted, either explicitly or implicitly, the standard-setting method of
coordination, or a close analog to it. For example, some early proposals were set
forth to change the structure of the domain names themselves in order to eliminate
existing conflicts between trademark law and domain name registrationY Under
some such proposals, a domain name might include both a geographic limitation
and a subject matter limitation" (e.g., mcdonalds.fastfood.us). Other proposals
similarly sought changes in the shape and appearance of domain names in order
to address specific problems facing the domain name system.59 Although many
of these proposals did not directly address questions of implementation, they
implicitly assumed that implementation would be effected through the existing
standard-setting process. As in the past, a committee would be formed to address
the questions, and then, after consensus was achieved, an RFC would be
published and subsequently adopted by the Internet community as a whole.
One prominent early domain name proposal was the Generic Top Level Domain
Memorandum of Understanding ("gTLD MoU" or "MoU").' Instead of changing
the structure of the domain names themselves, the gTLD MoU proposed the
addition of new top-level domains (e.g., .firm, .store, .rec, .nom) to the existing
top-level domains (e.g., .com, .gov), in order to address concerns about the
scarcity of domain names.6 ' In addition, it proposed that registration services for
top-level domains be opened up to competition among registrars.62 Finally, it
argued for the establishment of an international body to administer the system and
57. See, e.g., G. Peter Albert, Jr., Right on the Mark.- Defining the Nexus Between
Trademarks and Internet Domain Names, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 277, 310
(1997) (advocating the creation of domain name "masks" which would list multiple parties
sharing the same domain name, along with a description); David Collier-Brown, On
Experimental Top Level Domains (last modified Sept. 1996) <http://turing.sci.yorku.ca/
-davecb/tld/experiment.html>.
58. See, e.g., James W. Morando & Christian H. Nadan, Can Trademark Law Regulate the
Race to Claim Internet Domain Names?, COMPUTER LAw., Feb. 1996, at 10, 12.
59. See, e.g., Paul Vixie, External Issues in DNS Scalability (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http://ksgwww.harvard.edu/iip/vixie.html> (calling for the issuance of meaningless "license
plates" instead of domain names). Vixie subsequently withdrew this proposal in favor of an
alternative proposal involving multiple registries. See Maher, supra note 34.
60. See Establishment of a Memorandum of Understanding on the Generic Top Level
Domain Name Space of the Internet Domain Name System (gTLD-MoU) (last modified Feb.
28, 1998) <http://www.gtld-mou.org/gTLD-MoU.html> [hereinafter Generic Top Level
Domain Memorandum of Understanding].
61. Id; gTLD-MoU: FrequentlyAsked Questions (last modified June 1, 1998) <http://www
.gtld-mou.org/docs/faq.html>.
62. See Memorandum of Understanding for the Internet Council of Registrars
("CORE&shy; MoU") (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.gtld-mou.org/docs/core-mou.htn>.
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to deal with disputes over domain name "ownership."63 This body would be made
up of representatives from a number of existing Internet stakeholder groups.
Although the MoU, unlike other proposals, did not rely on existing standard-
setting procedures, the implementation process it pursued was closely analogous
to such procedures and relied on many of the same assumptions. In 1996, the
International Ad Hoc Committee ("IAHC") was formed to study the domain name
problem. The IAHC was composed of nominees from a number of existing
Internet governance groups (e.g., IAB, IANA, ISOC), 4 as well as the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") and the International
Telecommunications Union ("ITU"). 65 The IAHC convened a number of meetings
to discuss the domain name problem. Various proposals were discussed and a
"rough consensus" was achieved around what eventually became the MoU. Once
the MoU was drafted, it was posted upon the Internet and companies with an
interest in the Internet were asked to "sign on." The general idea was to generate
a certain critical mass of acceptance and, at that point, seek implementation of the
MoU by adding the top-level domains and permitting competition among
registries.' Although the process took place outside the normal standard-setting
process, it was in some ways analogous to the process in that it sought to build a
consensus and voluntary participation.67
The MoU was eventually supplanted by a domain name proposal set forth in
January of 1998 by the U.S. Department of Commerce under the guidance of Ira
Magaziner-the so-called "Green Paper."6 Like the MoU, the Green Paper
proposed opening up registration services to competition and creating a number
of new top-level domain names. However, instead of an international body to
administer the domain name system, the Green Paper called for the creation of a
private, not-for-profit corporation that would essentially take on a number of the
coordination and policy-making functions previously in the hands of IANA and
63. Id.; see also Summary of Comments: Registration and Administration of Internet
Domain Names, pt. C (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahomedomainname
/DNSCommentsSUM.htm> [hereinafter Summary of Comments] (summarizing the views of
some trademark holders that the creation of new gTLDs "would confuse users, increase
opportunities for the selection of infringing domain names, and make it harder for trademark
owners to police their marks").
64. See supra note 33.
65. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 419.
66. See Network Solutions'Preliminary Response to the IAHC 's Draft Specifications for
the Administration and Management ofgTLDs (last modified Jan. 14, 1997) <http://netsol.com
/news/apr_19970114.html> ("[N]o one has the legal basis, delegated by statute or otherwise,
to oversee and direct the affairs of the Internet. Without legal mandate, the Committee must
seek and obtain consensus for its actions.").
67. See Generic Top-Level Domain Memorandum of Understanding (last modified Dec.
14, 1998) <http://www.gtld-mou.org>. A major weakness in the MoU was its inability to
compel NSI to comply with its terms. Despite the efforts of the MoU, NSI continued to insist
that it would maintain control over the registration of top-level domains under its control. See
Kenneth Cukier, Internet Row Prompts Major Shake-Up (last modified Feb. 3, 1997)
<http://www.emap.com/cwi/177/177news2.html>.
68. See Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8826 (1998).
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NSI. This corporation would thus have the responsibility for distributing IP
addresses, managing the domain name root directory, and overseeing the policies
for the creation of new top-level domains. The corporation would be governed by
a board of directors, which would consist of representatives from a number of
different Internet "stakeholder" groups. The government would retain some
background oversight function until September 30, 2000, at which point, it would
withdraw completely from domain name governance.69
After soliciting numerous public comments on the Green Paper,70 the
Commerce Department issued in June of 1998 a final White Paper,7' which
contained many of the recommendations set forth in the Green Paper, though it
differed in a number of respects. In particular, it left a number of issues regarding
the structure of the domain name system (e.g., the addition of new top-level
domains, the minimum qualifications for competing registrars) to the new not-for-
profit corporation and provided less in the way of substantive guidance.72 The
basic structure of the Department of Commerce's "policy statement" remained
unchanged, however. The coordination functions once fulfilled by IANA would
now be fulfilled by a "new, not-for-profit corporation formed by private sector
Internet stakeholders." 73 The U.S. Government would initially enter into an
agreement with this new organization, but would eventually withdraw completely
from domain name governance by September 30,2000, once the new arrangement
had become sufficiently stable.74
In response to the White Paper's call for an "invit[ation] to work together to
form a... corporation to manage DNS functions," 75 various interested Internet
groups met over the following months to try to hammer out the structure and
shape of such a corporation.76 Meetings were held in Virginia, Geneva, and
Buenos Aires to discuss the recommendations in the White Paper.77 At these
meetings, some areas of consensus emerged, though many questions were left
unresolved.
Shortly before the September 30, 1998 deadline, however, IANA, through Jon
Postel, issued its own proposal for a new, not-for-profit domain name
organization, which it called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
69. See id. at 8832.
70. More than 430 comments were submitted in response to the Green Paper. See
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,741; John Borland, Domain
Name Plan Gathers Criticism (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.techweb.com/wirelstory/
domnam/TWB19980323S0029>.
71. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,741.
72. See id. at 31,745-46.
73. Id. at 31,749. The White Paper listed a number of criteria which such a corporation
should satisfy.
74. See id.
75. Id
76. See Amy Harmon, We the People of the Internet: Cybercitizens Debate How to Form
On-Line Union, Perfect or Otherwise, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 1998, at D10; see also
International Forum on the White Paper (visited Nov. 20, 1998) <http://www.ifwp.org>.
77. See The Berkman Center for Internet & Society, IFWP/DNS Work-in-Progress (visited
Jan. 27, 1999) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ifwp>.
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Numbers ("ICANN").7" The proposal included bylaws and very specific
provisions regarding the powers of the corporation and the appointment of its
directors. Although this proposal came under much criticism from other groups, 79
it quickly became the leading proposal. ICANN was subsequently incorporated,
the initial board of directors was appointed,"0 and in December 1998, after some
amendments to the bylaws in response to numerous concerns, the Department of
Commerce transferred domain name coordination functions to ICANN.8 ' As of
the time of this writing, 2 ICANN is engaged, under close scrutiny by members
of the Internet community, in fulfilling the functions laid out in the White Paper,
including, for example, considering how to open up registration services to
competition and whether and how to create additional top-level domains.
Unlike the MoU, implementation of the Green Paper's and White Paper's
recommendations was not sought so much through a ground up consensus-
building procedure, although the comment period after issuance of the Green
Paper was designed to gather input on the proposals. Rather, the proposals were
implicitly backed by the authority of the U.S. Government to implement changes
in the domain name system, either directly through legislation or through its
control of the NSF contract with NSI and the other coordinating bodies. Thus, in
some ways, the White Paper moved away from the preexisting standard-setting
model of Internet coordination. This Article will later discuss whether these
moves were ultimately successful. In the mean time, however, it is worth noting
that, despite this shift, the White Paper still drew heavily from the standard-
setting model and its underlying assumptions. First, the proposal continued to
treat the domain name problem as primarily a technical problem: "[W]e seek to
create mechanisms to solve a few, primarily technical (albeit critical) questions
about administration of Internet names and numbers."83 In addition, it conceived
of the solution to the problem mainly as one of technical standard-setting: "In
78. See ICANN: The Internet CorporationforAssigned Names and Numbers (last updated
Jan. 11, 1999) <http://www.ICANN.com>.
79. See, e.g., The Boston Group (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://pax.cavebear.com/bwg>;
Niall McKay, Critics Delay New Net Government (last updated Oct. 8, 1998) <http://www
.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/15482.html>.
80. See Meet the ICANNBoard (last updated Oct. 8, 1998) <http://www.wired.com/news/
news/politicsfstory/15499.html>.
81. See Niall McKay, Net Authority Passes to ICANN (last updated Oct. 20, 1998)
<http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/l15718.html>; Niall McKay, ICANN Gets
Green Light (last updated Nov. 24, 1998) <http:l/www.wired.comlnews/news/politics/
story/16469.html>.
82. One of the perpetual challenges of writing in this area is dealing with the incredible
pace of change in the subject matter. Accordingly, some of the references here and elsewhere
in the Article reflect the particular state of events at the particular time at which the Article was
written. Despite the rapid pace of change, I feel it still worthwhile to draw what relatively
enduring lessons we can from these rapidly shifting circumstances, and risk being proven
wrong (or rendered irrelevant) perhaps sooner than in other, less rapidly changing areas.
83. Improvement of Technical Management of IntemetNames and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg.
8826 (1998) (parenthetical in original).
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performing the functions listed above, the new corporation will act much like a
standard-setting body." 4
III. THE NONTECHNICAL NATURE OF DOMAIN NAME
PROBLEMS
As noted above, the problems surrounding the domain name system have, up
to now, largely been framed as technical standard problems, and the processes
used to resolve these problems have accordingly been analogs to the technical
standard-setting processes." This approach, however, fails to fully appreciate the
fact that domain name problems are not purely technical problems, but public
policy ones as well. Specifically, the domain name controversy raises difficult
issues regarding the proper distribution of a limited resource (domain names), the
allocation of authority to control such a resource, and the proper shape and
structure of the Internet as a whole. Such questions are "public" in nature, to the
extent that they affect all participants on the Internet and to the extent they
involve distribution of a quasi-public resource. Moreover, they cannot be
resolved solely by reference to a relatively neutral technical performance metric;
in many cases, conflicting value judgments may be irreconcilable.86 Domain name
problems are thus, in a number of ways, fundamentally unlike other technical
standard problems.
A. The Conflict with Trademark Law
The most visible aspect of the domain name problem has been the tension
between trademark law and domain name registration. This tension has been
made visible by a host of well-publicized lawsuits between trademark owners and
the holders of domain names corresponding to their trademarks.8 7 In the most
84. Id. at 8828.
85. See Johnson & Post, supra note 4, at 1388 (stating that "[e]xperience suggests that the
community of online users and service providers is up to the task of developing a self-
governance system" for domain names).
86. See Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CutMB. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1997)
("[C]ode is political .... [rihe architectures that are established in cyberspace have normative
significance, and... choices can be made about the values that this architecture will embed.
... If code is political, then it is not the task of engineers alone .... If code constitutes
cyberspace, then citizens must choose the code."); Lawrence Lessig, The Constitution of Code:
Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of Cyberspace Regulation, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
181, 184 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Constitution of Code] ("[Tihese are all policy choices
made by default by a structure of code that has developed-unaware at times, and, generally,
uncritically of the politics that code entails.").
87. See, e.g., Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, 150 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 1998);
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd.
v. Epix, Inc., No. 97-107-FR, 1997 WL 736486 (D. Or. Nov. 20, 1997); Juno Online Servs.,
L.P. v. Juno Lighting, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. 11. 1997); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Planned Parenthood v. Bucci, No.
97 Civ. 0629 (KMVV), 1997 WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), aft'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d
Cir. 1998); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. II1. 1996); Panavision, Inc.
[Vol. 74:587
DOMAIN NAME CASE STUDY
notorious cases, domain name "squatters" registered domain names corresponding
to famous trademarks and sought to sell the domain names at a profit to the
trademark owners. In other cases, disputes have arisen between parties each
having a colorable trademark-based claim to a given domain name."8 Numerous
articles have been written addressing the tension between trademark law and
domain name registration. 9
Although this is the most visible aspect of the problem, it is, if considered in
isolation, in some ways the least troubling. The courts have begun the process of
sorting through the trademark implications of domain names. In some cases,
domain names have been transferred to the trademark owners, under theories of
likelihood of confusion or trademark dilution.9" In other cases, the parties have
v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group,
Ltd., No. C96-130WD, 1996 WL 84853 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996) (discussing dispute
between Hasbro and LEG over candyland.com); MTV Networks v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (analyzing dispute between MTV and former V.J. Adam Curry over
mtv.com); Ray V. Hartwell, III & Stephen P. Demm, Courts Unclear Whether Internet Names
Infringe, NAT'L L.J., May 8, 1995, at C37 (discussing dispute between Stanley Kaplan and
Princeton Review over ownership of kaplan.com); Joshua Quittner, Billions Registered: Right
Now, There Are No Rules to Keep You from Owning a Bitchin 'Corporate Name as Your Own
Internet Address, WIRED, Oct. 1994, at 50, 54 (describing author's registration of
mcdonalds.com).
88. See, e.g., Actmedia, Inc. v. Active Media Int'l, Inc., No. 96C3448, 1996 WL 466527
(N.D. Ill. July 17, 1996); Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. C-96 20434 RPA/PVT,
1996 WL 887734 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 1996); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Astro-Med, Inc., No.
C-95-20602-JW, 1996 WL 36910039 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 1996).
89. See generally Albert, supra note 57; Alexander Gigante, "Domain-ia": The Growing
Tension Between the Domain Name System and Trademark Law, in COORDINATING THE
INTERNET, supra note 1, at 135; Neal J. Friedman & Kevin Siebert, The Name Is Not Always
the Same, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 631 (1997); Deborah Howitt, War.Com: Why the Battles
Over Domain Names Will Never Cease, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 719 (1997); Michael
Landau, Problems Arising Out of the Use of "www. trademark Com": The Application of
Principles of Trademark Law to Internet Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 455
(1997); David J. Loundy, A Primer on Trademark Law and Internet Addresses, 15 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 465 (1997); David W. Maher, Trademark Law on the
Internet-Will it Scale? The Challenge to Develop International Trademark Law, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPLTrER & INFO. L. 3 (1997); Gayle Weiswasser, Domain Names, the Internet,
and Trademarks: Infringement in Cyberspace, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPuTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
137 (1997); Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the Emerging Law
of Cybermarks, I RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (Apr. 10, 1995) <http://www.urich.edu/joltvlil/
burk.html>; Kenneth Dueker, Note, Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: trademark
Protection for Internet Addresses, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 483 (1996); Danielle Weinberg
Swartz, Comment, The Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing Domain Name Disputes,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1487 (1998); Ira S. Nathenson, Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name
Corral: Property Rights and Personal Jurisdiction over Squatters, Poachers and Other
Parasites, 58 U. PrIT. L. REV. 911 (1997); Milton Mueller, Trademarks and Domain Names:
Property Rights and Institutional Evolution in Cyberspace (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http://istweb.syr.edul-mueller/study.html>.
90. See Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313, at *3-10; Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1234-
41; Panavision, 945 F. Supp at 1301-04.
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settled, with the trademark generally going to the party with the trademark right.9
The legal system is gradually effecting a rough accommodation between
trademark law and the domain name registration system. To be sure, the process
is slow and costly. However, as decisions become more widely publicized,
litigation should decrease as the rights of trademark holders are more clearly
established.
The one area of potentially serious conflict involves the geographic and subject
matter scope of domain names. Whereas trademark law permits some limited
concurrent use of the same trademark (in different geographic areas or with
different products and services), the domain name system, as it is currently
structured, permits no concurrent use, since domain names are both unique and
operate worldwide.' Thus, for example, a pizza shop in New Haven and a pizza
shop in Seattle can both be called "Broadway Pizza." Similarly, both Apple
Records and Apple Computer can share the same "Apple" mark. There can be,
however, only one apple.com.
Although this inconsistency presents some tension, it is certainly not
unresolvable by the courts.9" The courts, in applying traditional trademark
principles, may resolve this tension in any one of a number of different ways. The
courts (1) might require the registration of different types of marks (e.g.,
applecomputer.com and applerecords.com); (2) could award the domain name to
neither party, in order to reduce consumer confusion; (3) could award the domain
name to the party that first registered it with NSI, or that first registered it
federally. If the courts fail to set clear standards, Congress can step in to clarify
the rights of the respective parties. In short, numerous options exist. Trademark
law can be adapted to fit the new medium of the Internet.94
B. Allocation Problems
Although the existing litigation concerning trademarks is, by itself, not an
unresolvable problem, it points to deeper underlying problems with the domain
name allocation system as a whole. NSI's current process of allocating domain
names is essentially first-come, first-served. Thus, anyone can register any
domain name, as long as it has not already been taken. In the wake of the above-
mentioned lawsuits (into which NSI was often dragged), NSI refined this process
to include provisions dealing with trademark claims. Thus, NSI will now suspend
91. Note that a number of these settlements may have more to do with the relative economic
strengths of the parties involved, rather than the strength of the underlying trademark claim.
92. See Nathenson, supra note 89, at 954.
93. See Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L.
REv. 695, 697 (1998).
94. Moreover some, at least, have argued that the use of domain names as de facto
directories will be displaced with the development of fully functioning Intemet directories. See
Mitchell et ai., supra note 46, at 264-66, 269. Indeed, even today, it is relatively easy to find
a given entity's domain name by using existing search engines. See Oppedahl, supra note 16,
at 170 ("It is a trivial matter to plug in the company name with any search engine and very
quickly to find the company's Web site.").
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operation of a domain name under certain circumstances, if presented with
evidence of valid trademark registration held by another party.95
Litigation has highlighted flaws with the first-come, first-served allocation
process. Most obviously, the existence of trademark litigation points to the fact
that the allocation process fails to adequately account for trademark rights ex
ante, thus leading to costly redistribution efforts ex post. NSI's attempts to deal
with these conflicts have been designed with an eye toward keeping NSI out of
litigation rather than toward any larger policy goal.96 Substantial concerns have
been raised over NSI's power to suspend operation of potentially extremely
valuable domain names, with the only recourse being the courts. NSI's policies
have, by and large, satisfied no one.97
Even more fundamentally, and largely overlooked in the focus on trademark
related problems, the first-come, first-served allocation process is an extremely
inefficient way to allocate a limited resource" such as domain names. Like any
pure registration system, the domain name allocation process gives rise to
wasteful "rent seeking" and "gold rushes," as parties compete to lock up
potentially valuable domain names, without any thought of productive use.99
Indeed, domain name brokers have already registered many names that they
believe will be valuable in the future."° Thus, there may be reasons to believe that
more rational allocation systems may be possible, certainly with respect to
trademark rights and possibly with respect to domain names in general. For
example, one could well imagine that "ownership" of a domain name might be
95. See Network Solutions' Domain Name Dispute Policy (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http:lwww.intemic.netfaq/dispute.html>; see also NSI Flawed Domain Name Policy
Information Page (visited Jan. 23, 1999) <http://www.patents.com/nsi.sht> (web site of
Oppedahl & Larson, L.L.P.).
96. See Oppedahl, supra note 16, at 160-66.
97. See Gigante, supra note 89, at 139-41; Maher, supra note 34; Oppedahl, supra note 16,
at 158-66; Shaw, supra note 21, at 115-18.
98. Some (e.g., NSI) have argued that the supply of domain names is in fact not scarce,
pointing to the fact that the 22 open spaces to the left of ".com" can be filled with 37 different
characters or symbols, leading to 37 to the 22nd power in domain names. See NSI, Internet
Domain Name System: Myths and Facts (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.netsol.com/policy/
MYTHS4.html>. In fact, the domain name space is much more limited than that, since it is
practically constrained by the number of meaningful combinations of letters, as well as by
trademark law. To McDonalds, for example, only one domain name will do.
99. See William Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & ECON. 265, 275 (1987). A situation analogous to the present one took place in the early
years of the trademark registration system. In 1965, Robert Aries registered over 100 valuable
U.S. trademarks (e.g., Pan American, NBC, Texaco, Monsanto) and forced the companies to
buy the marks from him. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 43, at 559-60; Gerald O'Brien, The
MadridAgreement Adherence Question, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 326, 328 (1966).
100. See Joshua Quittner, Life in Cyberspace: You Deserve a Break Today, NEWsDAY, Oct.
7, 1994, at A05, available in 1994 WL 7444048 ("[Domain name registration] is like a gold
rush: Two thousand requests a month are coming in to stake claim to a name on the Internet,
nearly 10 times as many as a year ago."); see also BestDomains (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http://www.bestdomains.com>; DomainMart: Your Marketplace for Internet Estates &
Businesses (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.domainmart.com>.
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limited in duration, subject to forfeiture, dependent upon certain conditions of
ownership, and so on.
These issues, regarding the proper allocation of domain names, are not
technical, but political in nature in that they involve competing value claims and
competing claims of right. The domain name space is, in many ways, a limited
public resource, as many of the domain name proposals seemed to recognize. The
gTLD MoU, for example, expressly stated that "the Internet Top Level Domain
(TLD) name space is a public resource and is subject to the public trust."'0 ' Much
of its value arises from the participation of "netizens," not through the efforts of
NSI. Furthermore, the government, through the NSF and the DARPA, has been
involved in the development and funding of Internet protocols and infrastructure.
The domain name space, as one of the consequences of such government
sponsored development, is thus, in many ways, a public resource.
The proper distribution of such a resource is a public policy question, not a
purely technical one. There arb numerous ways in which a limited resource can
be distributed. For example, trademark law distributes trademarks based on a
number of requirements, including the productive and continuing use of a mark.
It also has rules for resolving disputes over marks. The current domain name
allocation system, by contrast, includes almost none of these wider
considerations. Indeed, it seems designed solely for the purpose of trying to keep
NSI from being dragged into litigation.'0 2 Yet one could well imagine that a
broader view might be warranted.
C. Authority Problems
Apart from NSI's policies in allocating domain names, serious questions have
also been raised regarding NSI's authority to allocate such names in the first
place. NSI's actions in suspending certain domains in light of trademark claims
have led many to question the source of NSI's authority to do so, without any
recourse except the courts.'0 3 These questions were also raised when NSI began
to charge a fee for registering domain names.' The idea of a purely private
company having monopoly control over, and charging for, distribution of a quasi-
public resource is disturbing.'
NSI's authority to register domain names was ostensibly derived from its
"cooperative agreement" with the NSF, which delegated the authority to NSI in
101. Generic Top Level Domain Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 60, pt. I, § 2.a.
Indeed, the creation and development of Internet protocols is to some extent government
funded. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 21, 22, 24. That is one reason why they are
available to the public, and not owned by any single entity.
102. See Oppedahl, supra note 16, at 158-66 (documenting the various changes in NSI's
trademark dispute policy).
103. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,746
(1998); Oppedahl, supra note 16, at 164-66.
104. See Mitchell et al., supra note 46, at 260-61.
105. See Oppedahl, supra note 16, at 158; Shaw, supra note 21, at 115-16 (roughly
estimating the revenues that NSI has received from domain name registration).
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1993."° That contract, however, originally was scheduled to run out in September
of 1998. Prior to the issuance of the White Paper, NSI had asserted ownership
over the domain name database, and had indicated that it intended to continue to
register domain names, 7 giving rise to substantial concern about whether the rest
of the Internet community would continue to recognize its authority to do so (or
whether it would choose to recognize an alternative authority, such as the gTLD
MoU). These concerns have since been eased somewhat by the more active recent
involvement of the Department of Commerce in ensuring a "transition" to private
management of the domain name system by ICANN. However, the White Paper
itself raises a number of issues concerning authority, which will be discussed in
more detail below.
Note that similar authority questions also existed for IANA, as well. IP
addresses are also a limited resource.' Allocation of "blocks" of such addresses
to regional Internet providers was for some time done in a largely informal
manner by Jon Postel (and has since been transferred to ICANN). As demand for
larger and larger blocks of IP addresses increases, increasing scrutiny will be
given to allocation processes. These processes also have an element of value
judgment to them.0 9 While Jon Postel's sound judgment and reputation in the
Internet community had for some time led few to criticize his actions, newer
entrants into the Internet may well have differing views."0
This question, who should have the right to control, and indeed profit from,
allocation of a limited Internet resource, is far from a purely technical one.
Indeed, it is fundamentally a public policy question, involving questions of value
and competing claims of right. Existing stakeholders, for example, NSI, IANA,
domain name owners, and consumers, have an interest in the resolution of this
question, and changes to the allocation process will have a direct impact on them.
No objective metric can be appealed to in order to resolve this issue.
106. See NSF Cooperative Agreement, supra note 20, at art. 7.
107. See Cukier, supra note 67 ("NSI says it owns all the intellectual property rights to the
database containing the domain names ending in .com. In theory it says it could carry on
issuing .com addresses irrespective of any proposal ... from the IAHC.").
108. See generally Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 23-24 (discussing potential problems
with IP address allocation).
109. Indeed, the decision about who, in a given country, is the proper manager of that
country's domain name space is a question fraught with valuejudgments. See Shaw, supra note
21, at 111-13. Until recently, Jon Postel had largely given the registration right to whomever
applied first. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 26. Should a dispute arise, however, it is
unclear what the lines of authority should be.
110. See generally Mitchell et al., supra note 46, at 258-61 (discussing the broader
implications of the government's withdrawal of funding from many of the existing standard-
setting institutions, such as LANA and the IETF, and the need for the Internet to develop self-
sustaining institutions).
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D. Structural Problems
Some early proposals concerning the domain name system advocated changes
in the structure of domain names, and these too raise difficult policy questions.
As mentioned above, some proposals have called for changes to the domain
names themselves, in order to deal with the concurrent use problem presented by
trademark law. Thus, domain name space might look like "mcdonalds.fastfood.
us.com." Yet questions concerning the structure of domain names are clearly
based fundamentally on value, not technical standards."' Should domain names
conform to trademark law? How does this shape our perception of the Internet?
How should the Internet be zoned?" 2
Moreover, any changes to the existing domain name structure would inevitably
have real-world financial impacts on the owners of existing domain names.
Companies have invested quite substantial sums of money promoting their
domain names. Users have come to rely on existing domain names. Consideration
and weighing of such impacts involve questions of value and competing claims
of right, not technical performance. How are such claims to be resolved? As
should be clear, these questions cannot be resolved with reference to a technical
performance metric. Instead, they involve competing value claims, which must
be resolved through some kind of legitimate process, one that adequately takes
into account the interests of the many different stakeholders.
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF THE STANDARD-SETTING
PROCESS OF COORDINATION
Because the problems raised by domain names possess this fundamentally
value-based and interest-based character, the consensus-based technical standard-
setting process cannot resolve the domain name problems in a satisfactory
manner. In the domain name context, the various assumptions that underlie the
standard-setting approach no longer hold true. "Rough consensus" is not likely
to be possible where the universe of stakeholders is diverse and competing
economic interests are at stake. The result is that the technical standard-setting
process, to the extent it fails to include all stakeholders, will face (and indeed
already has faced) serious legitimacy problems. Absent true consensus among
relevant stakeholders, it is difficult to see how those who have de facto control
111. See Mockapetris, supra note 6, at 8 (acknowledging the "political decisions" that went
into the choice of the current top-level domains); see also W. Lazear, RFC 1031: Milnet Name
Domain Transition (Nov. 1987) (last modified Dec. 19, 1998) <http://www.faqs.org/rfcst
rfcl03I.html>; J. Postel & J. Reynolds, RFC 920: Domain Requirements (Oct. 1984) (last
modified Mar. 19, 1997) <http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc920.html>. Indeed, the fact that the
generic top-level domains are effectively controlled by the United States has political
overtones.
112. See Lessig, Zones of Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 1409-11. One example of the literally
political nature of Internet zoning was presented when Zaire was renamed Congo, and applied
to IANA for a change in its top-level domain. See Jos van Geffen, Changes in Domain List (last
modified June 23, 1997) <http://tnj.phys.tue.nl/stats/getstts/fomains.html>.
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over the Internet have a legitimate claim to impose standards that adversely affect
the interests of others. As a direct result of such legitimacy problems, the process
will no longer be able to rely upon the informal agreements that coordinated the
Internet in place of any central authority. Although the recent implementation of
the White Paper's proposals through ICANN goes further than earlier proposals
in recognizing the value-based nature of the problem, it does not go far enough.
A. The Failure of Standard-Setting Assumptions
The assumptions that underlie the standard-setting process no longer hold true
in the domain name context. First, "rough consensus" is not a realistic
possibility."' The relevant norms are no longer the relatively convergent norms
of a close community of engineers. Instead, the relevant community of
stakeholders now includes current domain name holders, who have a considerable
interest in any proposals for reform." 4 Both Yahoo.corn and Amazon.corn have
spent considerable sums promoting their domain names and have strong financial
interests in the structure and continuing management of the domain name
system." 5 Similarly, Internet users now have a direct interest as well." 6 The
structure of the domain name system has a direct impact on their experience as
browsers of the World Wide Web and as senders and receivers of e-mail.
Whereas before, these parties had little interest in the obscure, and largely
invisible, technical standards, they now have a direct interest in the future shape
of the domain name system."7 The dramatic expansion of the interested parties
means that true consensus will be difficult to achieve.
113. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 29 ("The IETF process has produced many
proposals for change, but few (if any) have been implemented because of the perceived need
for consensus, which is highly valued but notoriously slow to achieve.") (parenthetical in
original).
114. See Mitchell et al., supra note 46, at 258 (arguing that "we can no longer rely on this
protected environment to shelter [the Interet's] existence and preserve its cultural ethic").
115. See A.M. Rutkowski, Internet Domain Names and Other Identifiers: A Roadmap
Among Issues and Initiatives (last modified Nov. 20, 1996) <http://www.wia.org/pub/
identifiers/issues-roadmap.html>.
[F]or a variety of reasons, it is the business community that presently is least able
to participate in ongoing forums dealing with these issues. Few people in the
corporate or public policy worlds are familiar with, or would participate in, the
kind of forums traditionally used by the Internet community for collaboration and
decision making-which are fine tuned for working technical level and research
and academic participation.
Id.
116. See Tony Rutkowski, Parties ofInterest in Internet Public Policy Matters (last modified
Apr. 5, 1998) <http://www.wia.org/pub/policy-orgs.htrl> (listing parties with an interest in
the domain name issue); Shaw, supra note 21, at 124 ("Who are the parties that should be
consulted on the evolution of international Internet name space? Certainly many more than are
currently involved.").
117. Indeed, the acceptance and incorporation of new voices presents a challenge to the
existing standard-setting process. Given that the Internet is largely controlled by a rather small
community with a strong, established culture, how easily does this community incorporate new
voices with values markedly different from their own?
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The fact that value-choices are involved also indicates that decisions are no
longer readily measured against any single metric. Technical standards can be
measured against a performance metric. However, decisions regarding the
structure of domain name space, or the relative authority that various parties
should have in allocating domain names, are not purely technical questions and
cannot be measured against a performance metric. Indeed, there may be no single
solution that is identifiably "optimal"; many different structures may be quite
possible. Moreover, different structures will have differing impacts on the various
parties involved. Under such circumstances, claims of expertise are not readily
acknowledged, much less deferred to.
Furthermore, the scale and popularity of the Internet today suggest that exit
from the system is no longer a realistic possibility, and that "voluntary"
compliance with existing standards is no longer so voluntary.' 8 In the past, the
legitimacy of Internet technical standards was based, in part, on the idea that
compliance was entirely voluntary. While in theory, individual computers on the
Internet can choose to follow a different domain name authority, in practice,
powerful network effects bind all of the computers on the Internet onto the
current system." 9 Opposition to the current network will be extremely difficult,
given the distributed nature of the Internet. Unless such opposition results in a
credible alternative to the current network, parties will be bound together in a
kind of "tyranny of the network."'"2 The difficulty of collective action in a
distributed network means that the few points of central control wield a
disproportionate amount of power.
Finally, neutral and trusted institutions may be few and far between where
domain names are concerned. It is no coincidence that the questioning of NSI's
authority became particularly acute as the NSF began to withdraw its seal of
approval.'2 ' The NSF's presence in the background had served as a potential
118. This illustrates the important general point that conditions that existed in the past may
no longer exist today or in the future. The Internet of today presents a different coordination
challenge than the Internet of the past.
119. I thus tend to disagree with Johnson and Post about the "voluntary" nature of
participation in Internet standards. See Johnson & Post, supra note 1, at 74 ("The rules instead
evolved from the decentralized decisions by individuals to adopt a promising standard because
it served their own interests."). Because of strong network effects, computers participate
"voluntarily" only because the Internet is the only game in town. Johnson and Post
acknowledge this point later in their article, see id at 75, but this acknowledgment would seem
to undercut the legitimacy of the common standard, to the extent it rests on any ideas of
voluntary participation.
120. See generally Lessig, Path of Cyberlaw, supra note 4 (discussing how code regulates
behavior); James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired
Censors (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/facultyboyle/foucault
.htm>; Krol & Hoffman, supra note 33, at 4-5 (analogizing Internet standard-setting to the
doctrines of a church). "If you go to a church and accept its teachings and philosophy, you are
accepted by it, and receive the benefits. If you don't like it, you can leave. The church is still
there, and you get none of the benefits. Such is the Internet." Id. at 5.
121. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 421-22 ("When DARPA and later the NSF controlled
the Internet, these sponsoring agencies provided the necessary authority for the ad hoc groups
to allocate among themselves jurisdiction over the various operational aspects of the federal
government :s computer network.") (each emphasis in original).
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public-interest check on the activities of NSI in the registration process. (Indeed,
the rosy view of consensus building prevalent in the technical standards
coordination process may, in part, be illusory, to the extent that this background
government presence served as a basis for adherence to the technical standards.)
As that presence recedes, concerns have arisen over NSI's role as a private
institution entrusted with management of a limited, quasi-public resource.
Maintenance of purely technical standards is primarily an administrative task,
involving comparatively less value judgment. The important thing is not who
holds the information, but that someone holds the information. In the domain
name context, however, registration of domain names is not a purely neutral
ministerial task, and the identity of the registrar matters.
B. Implications for the Standard-Setting Approach
The inapplicability of the above assumptions means that any attempt to
implement change through a pure standard-setting process, as earlier proposals
had attempted, faces several problems."' First, the existing technical standard-
setting process faces serious legitimacy problems when applied to the domain
name problem. Any solution arrived at, whether by the IETF or by parties outside,
that is, through the MoU or between IANA and NSI, does not truly represent a
"rough consensus" among all of the relevant stakeholders. For example, the MoU
was drafted by many of the same parties that participate currently in Internet
governance. Other interested parties, such as content providers, Internet service
providers, marketers, et cetera, were not fully represented."z Similarly, the wider
population of users of the Internet had no effective voice in the process.' 24
Although various public interest groups did comment upon the MoU, it is difficult
to say to what extent these groups accurately reflect the beliefs of the wider
population of users, absent any formal mechanism for preference aggregation.
25
To the extent that "rough consensus" is achieved through the existing standard-
setting process without input from these parties, 26 standards based on such
122. I address in this Part the earlier proposals to reform the domain name system. The more
recent attempts currently being implemented I discuss infra Part IV.C.
123. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,743
(1998); Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 32-33.
But it is fantasy to suggest that authority for the domain name appeals process
will be perceived as legitimate if it is assigned to LANA in its present incarnation,
the Internet Society (ISOC), or the Internet Architecture Board (IAB). The
stakeholder community for domain name assignments is the whole world, and
none of these organizations comes close to being representative.
Id. at 32.
124. See 01CAnnotated Version of the gTLD-MoU (last modified June 11, 1997) <http:l/
www.interactivehq.orgloic/html2/nngtld.htm> (questioning, at times quite vociferously, the
IAHC's authority to speak for the Internet community as a whole).
125. See Cukier, supra note 107 (noting that the IAHC "has been buffeted by international
criticism both of its controversial plan and of its consultative process").
126. Even without inclusion of all of these points of view, rough consensus among the
smaller group of Internet insiders may still be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve, as indicated by the current status of many domain name proposals.
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consensus represent little more than the preferences of a minority of Internet
participants. 2 7 Before consensus can legitimately be reached and subsequently
invoked to justify a particular action, the relevant stakeholders must all have been
consulted. Without such an inclusive sweep, reliance on industry "self-regulation"
begs the question of who is the "self' doing the regulating. In a world of
competing value judgments, the rejection of "voting" in David Clark's
description of the technical standards formation process is troubling. 2 Where
policy issues are involved, voting may be the only viable option.
Indeed, in many ways, the pure technical standard-setting process, at least as
applied to the domain name problem, is rather undemocratic."'29 Instead of seeking
out, through some more formal process, the preferences of all of the relevant
stakeholders in the domain name debate, the standard-setting process relies on
rough consensus among a more limited range of participants, who may or may not
accurately represent all of the interests on the Internet. There is little room for
voice. 3 The very distributed nature that makes the Internet so difficult to govern,
in turn, makes it difficult to organize any resistance to the few centralized points
of control. It may be that the existing participants have arrived at an objectively
good solution to the problem.' However, there is at least a feeling of being
governed by a group of (benevolent, to be sure) platonic guardians. ' 2
At the same time, any conscientious attempt to include the universe of relevant
stakeholders will likely result, for the above reasons, in an inability to come to
any consensus at all. Even within the engineering community, consensus on the
domain name problem has been difficult to achieve.' When the views of a
broader segment of the population are taken into account, consensus will likely
be impossible. Moreover, even aggregating such preferences would be logistically
quite difficult. The practical functioning of the current standard-setting process
(e.g., open meetings, working groups) assumes a relatively limited set of
127. See Lessig, Z6nes of Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 1410 ("Engineers write the code; the
code defines the architectures, and the architectures define what is possible within a certain
social space. No process of democracy defines this social space, save if the market is a process
of democracy.").
128. See Dialogue, supra note 50; Shaw, supra note 21, at 124 ("The Internet has become
far too commercial and strategically important as a global communications tool to simply
perpetuate the same informal arrangements that have kept it glued together until now.").
129. But see Johnson & Post, supra note 4, at 1389-91 (advancing a positive view of Internet
democracy).
130. Indeed, voice may be particularly difficult for newcomers who hold values that differ
markedly from those held by the dominant Internet community. Thus, for example, parties with
primarily commercial interests may have a more difficult time getting their interests seriously
considered.
13 1. Given that domain name governance raises complex, nontechnical policy questions,
there may be reasons to believe that the lack of full participation may have resulted in a
substantively less-than-optimal result.
132. Indeed, as Gigante points out, to the extent that these groups act together in concerted
fashion, their coordination of the Internet may raise antitrust concerns. See Gigante, supra note
11, at 430; see also Goldfoot, supra note 11, at 909.
133. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,743 (1998)
(detailing the failed attempts by the engineering community to achieve consensus).
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participants. Even in the purely technical standard-setting area, this model has
become increasingly stretched as the Internet has become more and more
prominent. It would be stretched well past the breaking point if it truly tried to
accommodate all of the stakeholders in the domain name problem. The New
England town meeting does not function so well on a national (much less
international) scale.
The existing standard-setting process's lack of legitimacy highlights another
related problem, the lack of actual authority to compel adoption of changes.'
Formal legal authority has been unnecessary in the consensus-based realm of
technical standards, as these standards are largely value-neutral and the process
of arriving at them has been considered legitimate. In the domain name context,
however, the lack of clear legitimacy in any of the competing processes means
that voluntary coordination is substantially in doubt.'35 The lack of formal
authority becomes extremely problematic, as no given entity can guarantee the
implementation of a given standard, even if one were established. The result is
a "policy vacuum."' 36 No institutions can effectively serve as fora within which
to resolve the numerous policy issues presented by the domain" name issue. Any
attempts by specific parties to engage in policy making are met with stiff
resistance, as in the case of both NS1'" and the IAHC. The authoritative bodies
are thus reduced to suggesting only incremental improvements (e.g., IAHC's
MoU) or clinging to arid, policy-neutral processes (e.g., NSI's first-come, first-
served allocation process). 3 Larger policy issues remain unaddressed.
C. A Partial Solution: The White Paper and ]CANN
In many ways the involvement of the Department of Commerce, its specific
proposals in the White Paper, and the current implementation of these proposals
through ICANN can be seen as an implicit recognition of, and response to, the
above failure of the standard-setting approach'to achieve a sustainable and
legitimate "rough consensus" about the future of the domain name system. It
addresses the problem of lack of authority by wielding the background threat of
more intrusive government action in this area, as well as its control over the
contract with NSI and other coordinating Internet bodies. There is little doubt that
the government has the ultimate authority to legislate a result in this area. 39 It
134. See Gillett & Kapor, supra note 21, at 32 ("Authority can only be readily exercised if
it is perceived as legitimate by all stakeholders.").
135. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 428 ("[Ihe private sector's acquiescence is critical to
the IAHC's assumption of the role of overall Internet governing body. However, such
acquiescence is unlikely where the IAHC system threatens fundamental rights.").
136. Johnson, supra note 23.
137. See Oppedahl, supra note 16, at 172 ("NSI, the holder of a position of public trust
regarding nearly all of the domain names on the Internet, cannot be permitted to continue to
develop its policies with no meaningful stakeholder involvement.").
138. See Johnson, supra note 23.
139. This is true, at least domestically. International interests have been more critical of the
U.S. Government's role in domain name coordination. See infra text accompanying notes 147,
168-70; see also Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1001
(1994); Telecommunications Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560-561 (Supp. H 1996) (seeking
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addresses the problem of lack of legitimacy by publishing its proposal and
soliciting comments from the public at large, from literally nearly anyone who
wishes to comment. In this way, the draft Green Paper and subsequent discussion
of the White Paper provided a truly public forum for the consideration of
differing views about the future of the domain name system.
At the same time, however, the specific proposals advanced in the White Paper
and their implementation in ICANN fail to satisfy both of these requirements of
authority and legitimacy, and do not go far enough in recognizing the policy
aspects of the domain name problem. Specifically, rather than addressing the
difficult substantive policy problems concerning the domain name system, the
White Paper vests authority over such issues in a private, not-for-profit
corporation, ICANN. In some ways, this solution is an improvement over the
status quo. Because ICANN's board of directors consists of members of various
Internet stakeholder groups, decisions by the corporation would be more
representative than decisions by an unaccountable individual (even one as well-
regarded as Jon Postel) or an unaccountable private corporation (such as NSI).
Thus, ICANN at least establishs some sort of quasi-representative process
through which conflicting policy claims could be resolved. 140 Moreover, the
decisionmaking process is centralized, formalized, and derives some level of
authority from the background approval of the federal government. Finally, as the
White Paper itself points out, private management will likely be more responsive
than government to changes in technology and the market. 141
By vesting policy-making authority in a private corporation and eventually
moving toward complete government withdrawal, however, the White Paper fails
to put completely to rest questions of authority and legitimacy. Most generally,
why should questions of domain name policy be placed in the hands of a purely
private entity, even one that is somewhat more representative of the interests of
many current Internet stakeholders? Although basic coordination functions (e.g.,
maintenance of the root directory) might usefully be managed by such an entity
(through contract with the government), broader questions about the structure of
the domain name system (e.g., the shape and number of additional top-level
domaing) do not seem legitimately settled in this fashion. What will guarantee
that this private corporation will adequately represent the interests of the Internet
to regulate the architecture of the Internet).
140. The Green Paper itself recognizes that there are "substantial differences among Internet
stakeholders on how the domain name system should evolve." Improvement of Technical
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826, 8827 (1998) (to be codified
at 15 C.F.R. ch. XXIII) (proposed Feb. 20, 1998).
141. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,744
(1998).
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community as a whole?142 How will it account for changes in the make-up of that
community?
4 1
More specifically, if this private corporation has control over Internet policy
decisions, then questions of legitimacy will inevitably revolve around the make-
up of the corporation's board of directors and its procedures. The Green Paper
originally proposed that three seats be given to IP number registries, two seats to
domain name registries, two seats to representatives of the technical community,
and seven seats to representatives of Internet users in general, both commercial
and noncommercial.'" The specific proposal eventually implemented in ICANN
included a different distribution.14 Predictably, much criticism has arisen over
these distributions, as specific interest groups seek to obtain greater
representation. 46 After all, if true consensus is not likely, then the composition
of the board takes on much significance.
47
The White Paper's implementation of its substantive proposal through ICANN
thus represents an awkward combination of a standard-setting and representation-
based approach to domain name coordination. It recognizes that differing interest
groups may have very different views concerning the future of the domain name
system, and that rough consensus may not be achievable. Accordingly, it seeks
to construct a process through which various interests may be accommodated and
differing views may be resolved. At the same time, however, it attempts to place
this process in a purely private context, within the structure of a not-for-profit
corporation, and anticipates complete government withdrawal from domain name
coordination by the year 2000. This latter approach indicates a continuing
underlying adherence to the idea that the domain name problem is primarily a
142. The White Paper limits its prescriptions on this score to suggestions such as: "The new
corporation should operate as a private entity for the benefit of the community as a whole,"
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,749, or, "The organization
and its board should derive legitimacy from the participation of key stakeholders," id. at
31,750. The White Paper studiously avoids, however, the difficult details.
143. Once again, the White Paper declines to grapple with any of the tricky details, instead
simply noting that "the new corporation's charter should provide a mechanism whereby its
governing body will evolve to reflect challenges in the constituency of Internet stakeholders."
Id. at 31,750. Indeed, as of the time of this writing, ICANN has begun to seek to transform
itself into a membership-based organization in an effort to address precisely these concerns.
144. The White Paper subsequently backed away from such specifics. See id. at 31,745.
145. See LANA Draft Bylaws-Fifth Iteration (last updated Sept. 28, 1998) <http://www.
iana.orglbylaws5.html>.
146. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,745 ("Most of
those who criticized the proposed allocation of Board seats called for increased representation
of their particular interest group on the Board of Directors."); see also Elinor Mills, Complaints
Prompt Fifth Draft ofDomain Name Plan (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.infoworld.com/
cgi-bin/displayStory.pl?980930.eidoman.htm> (explaining that domain name plans lack
consensus).
147. Much criticism has also legitimately been directed by international corporations and
governments at the exclusively U.S. focus of the Green Paper's and White Paper's proposals.
See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,748; Douglas Hayward,
Europeans Disappointed by Net Names Plan (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.techweb.com/
wire/story/domnanTWB19980130S0009>.
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technical standards problem best left to resolution by private industry, rather than
through public coordination. 1
48
Ironically, the very debate (both in general and in the comments submitted in
response to the Green Paper) over the White Paper's proposals reveals the
inherent limits of the White Paper's substantive proposals. By setting forth the
proposal for comment, the Department of Commerce provided a valuable forum
in which the wide variety of current Internet stakeholders had a voice.
49
Moreover, the government's involvement in creating the forum lent it a certain
degree of legitimacy, and few appear to dispute the government's ultimate
authority in this area. Yet the very breadth of the comments reveals the limits of
the White Paper's approach, in funneling the discussion over the future of the
domain name system artificially through a quasi-representative, private
corporation's board of directors. The proposal satisfies the coordination function,
but does not fully address (although it does somewhat ameliorate) the underlying
and more fundamental legitimacy and authority problems. The scope of the
response to the proposal reveals the difficulties in returning to a consensus-based
view of private standards-coordination.
V. ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY FOR
DOMAIN NAME COORDINATION
The above analysis suggests that the fundamental problems that dog the domain
name system, lack of legitimacy and authority, will not be resolved without some
rethinking of the domain name coordination process. A number of possible
options present themselves. One would be to eliminate the awkward confluence
of technical standards and substantive policy by eliminating the source of the
policy problems, the domain name system. Another option would be to create a
process through which interests of Internet stakeholders could fairly and neutrally
be taken into account. In the end, however, some continuing degree of
background government presence will probably be necessary in order to maintain
both the operative degree of legitimacy and control over the coordination process.
A. Abolish Domain Names
One radical solution to the existing domain name coordination problem would
simply be to recognize that the technical standard-setting process has
inadvertently stumbled into a nontechnical policy arena, and that the proper
course of action is simply to withdraw, that is, to get rid of the domain name
148. Indeed, shortly after being appointed, the directors of ICANN scheduled numerous
open meetings at various locations around the world in an effort to build trust among the
Internet community.
149. In response to the initial RFC, the Department of Commerce received more than 430
comments totaling some 1500 pages. See Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63
Fed. Reg. at 31,741. In response to its Green Paper, the Department of Commerce received
more than 650 comments. See id The RFCs, the Green Paper, and the submitted comments are
available at National Telecommunications & Information Administration (last modified Jan.
4, 1999) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov>.
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system entirely. 5 This, in many ways, would be an ideal result. In creating the
domain name system, the founders of the Internet never imagined or intended that
it would eventually give rise to difficult questions about distribution among the
current, broad group of Internet stakeholders. 5' Under this approach, numerical
or unintelligible text-basis addresses would now be the only source-indicators for
computers on the Internet. The loss of the mnemonic value of domain names
would be more than compensated by the gain from the reduction in wasteful
litigation and other activity surrounding domain names. Internet directories or
other technical solutions could then develop to fill the gap, as, indeed, existing
search engines already do (though somewhat inefficiently)..
Such a solution would, in many ways, be most in keeping with the decentralized
nature of Internet coordination in general. Instead of referring to a single (though
decentralized and distributed) database for the "naming" of particular areas of the
web, Internet naming would be layered on top of the underlying system by
numerous different Internet directories. The naming function could thus be
decentralized and open to competition. Different Internet search engines might
structure cyberspace in different ways. Individuals could then vote with their
feet.'52 Trademark issues would be settled at the private search engine level,
rather than at any central point of coordination. The technical standard itself
would thus return to a purely technical standard, one that does not raise troubling
distributional and policy questions.
Unfortunately, it is probably much too late in the day for this option to be
successfully implemented, at least through the current standard-setting process.'
Interests are already firmly entrenched. Domain name holders and existing
domain name registrars would raise howls of protest. Moreover, the displacement
of such interests would, at this stage, be a political decision, not a purely
technical one. Having ventured into this arena, the technical standard-setting
process cannot easily extract itself. And although the government could dictate
this result by fiat, resistance by the larger Internet community would likely be
quite fierce.
150. See, e.g., Vixie, supra note 59 (calling for issuance of meaningless "license plates"
instead of domain names); see also Gigante, supra note 89, at 145 (discussing Vixie's
proposal).
151. See Dialogue, supra note 50.
152. For this proposal to work, search engine technology would have to improve from its
existing state of the art. Moreover, certain criteria (such as whether the search engine accepted
payment from companies to be listed at the top) would need to be made transparent.
153. See Maher, supra note 89, at 4 ("Moving to a DNS with meaningless word and number
combinations would likely make all the trademark problems disappear, but this proposal seems
to have almost no support."); Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual
Property Protection for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644, 2651-54 (1994) (From
a political economy standpoint, "the opportunity for comprehensive reform is most propitious
before interest groups form around a new technology.").
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B. Direct Internet Democracy
Another possibility would be to construct a process that formally takes into
account and aggregates the interests of the various stakeholders, that is, the
engineers, the Internet users, domain name owners, and domain name registrars.
This is basically a strategy that takes the White Paper's proposal to its logical
conclusion. Instead of governance by a quasi-representative, private corporation
such as ICANN, whose board structure and processes are subject to legitimacy
questions, a process could be constructed to actively take into account input from
all walks of the Internet population and aggregate this input into a substantive
policy decision. The idea would be to create something akin to a direct Internet
democracy on questions of policy, such as the structure of the domain name
space. Indeed, the most recent efforts of ICANN to turn itself into a "membership
organization" constitute an attempt, in some limited way to create just such a
structure.
In many ways, the Internet is ideally suited to aggregation of such preferences
in an informed way. Various position papers could be presented on-line, along
with threaded discussions. Such virtual town meetings could then be followed up
with an Internet referendum. Assuming that the various parties could come to an
accommodation on a legitimate process, the result of such a process would then
have a much greater claim to legitimacy, as it would more truly reflect the
interests of the wider Internet population.
One problem with this option is that no system currently exists to aggregate
such preferences, and the creation of such a process would be extremely difficult,
as the current debate over ICANN's membership policies indicates. Even
assuming that the various parties could come to some agreement on process, the
details of such a process would be dauntingly complicated. 5 4 Moreover, there
may be good reasons to believe that the relevant parties would not come to
agreement on the process, given that the specific matter to be determined is
already defined. Jockeying for advantage based on predicted voting patterns
could well make agreement on the process impossible.
In addition, there is also the risk that such direct democracy will not be
adequately informed, particularly if technical issues are implicated by the
substantive policy debates. Although much of this Article has focused on the fact
that domain name issues are not purely technical, neither are they purely public
policy questions. Indeed, a full appreciation of the available options may require
both a grasp of the policy implications and the possibilities allowed by the
technology. Thus, for this reason, too direct an influence on domain name
governance is likely not warranted. 5'
154. See Carl S. Kaplan, A Kind of Constitutional Convention for the Internet (last modified
Oct. 23, 1998) <http:/www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/10/cyber/cyberlaw/231aw.html>
(analogizing ICANN to a "unique form of government for the global Internet").
155. But see Deliberative PollingrMin Cyberspace (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://cyber.law.
Harvard.edu/9-10mtg/idp.html>.
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Given the above concerns, it will be interesting to see whether ICANN can
successfully create a representative structure that is viewed as sufficiently
legitimate. The most recent proposals are beginning to open up the structure to
more participation, but still place the bulk of authority in the hands of the
governing board. However, if ICANN is ultimately successful in creating such a
structure, and if such a structure is both sufficiently inclusive and widely regarded
as legitimate, then many of the concerns will have been addressed. The
difficulties noted above, however, suggest that this will not be an easy task.
C. Continuing Background Government Presence
Constructing a new process may, however, be unnecessary given the
availability of an existing body for aggregating preferences in determining the
public interest: the government. There is a reason why difficult policy questions
in other areas are not addressed through appeals to "consensus." Policy questions
are far too messy and people have far too divergent views. While consensus-
seeking might work in the New England town meeting, it tends to fail at the
national level. Government, for all of its faults, provides the mechanism through
which the preferences of a larger population are aggregated and expressed in
public policy. The Internet today, and in the future, will implicate the interests of
a broader and broader population. In the domain name context, the time for town
meetings may well be past.
Continuing government involvement, if properly limited, would not mean a
radical change in the status quo; in fact, it would mean less change. In many
ways, the current problems facing the domain name system can be directly traced
to the federal government's (and the NSF's) stated intention to withdraw from
Internet coordination altogether. The NSF's presence (and the presence of
DARPA) in the past served, in effect, as a kind of government guarantee that
issues concerning administration of the domain name system would never get that
far out of line from the public interest. In the absence of such a guarantee,
crippling issues regarding legitimacy and authority have arisen."5 6 Although the
government's recent involvement in handing control over the domain name
system to ICANN has eased some of these concerns in the short run, legitimacy
concerns will continue to dog ICANN, particularly after the government
eventually withdraws from domain name governance, as it intends on doing.
Such problems may be obviated if the NSF or the Department of Commerce (or
some similar organization'), instead of withdrawing from domain name
governance entirely, simply maintains some limited continuing background role
156. See Gigante, supra note 11, at 423.
157. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") very likely has statutory
jurisdiction over Internet issues, see 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-152 (1994), but has expressly disavowed
any interest in getting involved in Internet governance issues, see Gigante, supra note 1I, at
421-22. Instead, the FCC has adopted the very hands-off attitude that has been characteristic
of the Clinton Administration's approach to Internet governance issues. See A Frameworkfor
Global Electronic Commerce: Executive Summary (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www
.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/Commerce/summary.html> (setting forth the Administration's
approach to Internet issues).
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in Internet coordination. Indeed, the renewal of NSI's contract presented the
perfect opportunity for a fresh consideration of the terms of that contract, perhaps
after a period for notice and comment. In light of the Internet's widespread
dissatisfaction with NSI's handling of various allocation issues, any new contract
could have been structured to avoid preexisting problems. Indeed, the contract
could have been structured to offer competition among various registrars. The
rights of the various parties could have been better defined. Coordination with the
trademark office might have been made possible. 5 Alternatively, a more limited
version of the not-for-profit corporation envisioned by the White Paper could be
given some delegated power to engage in domain name management functions,
so long as a background accountability to the federal government is maintained
(for example, through a contractual relationship, as with the NSF or the
Department of Commerce).
While the details would take some effort to work out, the important feature of
such involvement is that the questions of legitimacy in domain name coordination
would be substantially addressed by the continuing background government
presence. Of all the parties involved in the domain name dispute, the NSF has the
strongest claim to management of and responsibility for the domain name space.
Up to now, despite dissatisfaction with NSI, none of the other parties has
challenged the NSF's underlying authority to confer the Internet management
responsibilities upon NSI. The NSF is, moreover, expressly a public-regarding
institution, charged with a public mandate.'59 It is ultimately accountable through
the democratic process. It does not rely on any private interests, or coalition of
private interests, for funding. This presents a contrast with existing Internet
stakeholders or groups of stakeholders, such as the IAHC, NSI, or ICANN, who
would seek to take on this role and who have accordingly been subject to
challenge by other members of the wider Internet community. By once again
contracting out coordination responsibilities, the NSF could delegate these
responsibilities to the private sector while maintaining a useful background check
on the private sector's execution of these responsibilities (as in the case with the
NSI contract).
In addition to conferring legitimacy and authority on the coordinating and
technical management bodies, the NSF, or some other agency, 6 ' could also take
a role in actively asking some of the larger policy questions concerning domain
158. See Shaw, supra note 21, at 127-28 (suggesting ways in which various government
agencies might be involved).
159. Under its charter, the NSF is authorized to foster the development of computer
technologies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1862(a)(4) (1994); see also High-Performance Computing Act
(HPCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 5501, 5521 (1994) (authorizing the NSF to promote development of
network computing). See generally Gigante, supra note 11, at 414.
160. In this Article, I have focused in particular on the NSF and the Department of
Commerce as the two most likely agencies, mostly because of their existing role in Internet
issues. It may well be that an alternative agency may be better structured to address the
particular types of issues raised by the domain name system. For the purposes of this Article,
however, I am primarily concerned that some government body accept responsibility for this
issue. The identity of that government body is a question I have not expressly addressed in this
project.
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name allocation.'6 ' Indeed, the response to the Department of Commerce's White
Paper illustrates the value of government as a forum for expressing and
aggregating interests, and coordinating the effectuation of such interests on
questions of policy. Prior to the Department of Commerce's involvement, the
future status of the domain name system was substantially in doubt. Moreover, no
organized mechanism existed for the consideration of various perspectives on the
domain name problem. Attempts to organize and coordinate change on a private
basis met with significant resistance and uncertainty over authority. By setting
forth the Green Paper and soliciting comments, the Department of Commerce,
whatever the merits of its substantive proposal, at least established a process that
many Internet participants appear to view as legitimate. 62 This suggests, at the
very least, that the government could have a valuable role in continuing to foster
debate, not so much over who should decide the shape of domain name space (the
current debate offered by the White Paper), but what that shape should look like.
Although a private organization, such as ICANN, can seek to take on this role, it
will, by its very nature, constantly be subject to lingering questions about its
legitimacy and possible conflicts of interest.
It is true that government involvement, even in the background, may, to some
extent, make domain name governance less responsive to technological change.
To some extent, this may be a necessary price of a more legitimate process. On
the other hand, the conflicts and struggles currently resulting from the existing
private coordination model cast some doubt on its claims at being significantly
more responsive to technological change. Indeed, as pressure increases on
ICANN to make its procedures more formalized and transparent, we can expect
that its responsiveness will be reduced. 63 Moreover, technical input may be
incorporated by the government agency through reliance on advisory committees.
Similarly, traditional concerns about the risk of agency capture are less acute,
since the alternative, an organization such as ICANN, is subject to even greater
critique on this score."
It is important to note here that this policy-shaping role would be limited to
certain questions, such as those about the domain name system (e.g., how many
and what kinds of top-level domains), that strongly implicate substantive policy
and involve a wide range of stakeholders; it would not apply to primarily
technical questions, such as those involving the underlying Internet protocol.
Such latter questions are appropriately left to the existing standard-setting
process, since that process is (at least for now) well adapted to answering them
161. This Article has not sought to articulate a particular substantive solution to the issues
facing the domain name system. Instead, it has focused on the underlying flaws in the existing
processes, which have structurally prevented adequate consideration of such issues.
162. But not all Internet participants view the process as legitimate. See Comments on the
Registration and Administration of Internet Domain Names <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahomefdomainname/email/> (including comments submitted by WIPO, EU, and IAHC).
163. The more formalized and transparent (and therefore legitimate) the processes become,
the more ICANN itself begins to resemble government, and the less it can claim some inherent
advantage over government regulation.
164. ICANN is, by definition, captured insofar as its board members come from the industry
that it is designed to regulate.
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and surely better suited than government involvement. Instead, the government's
role as a coordinator and mediator of differing interests would be implicated only
in those limited areas, such as the domain name controversy, where broader
policy issues are at stake, and perhaps even then only after the existing standard-
setting process and other decentralized coordination mechanisms have failed to
arrive at an appropriate consensus or solution.'65 This Article has argued that the
domain name controversy is just such an area.
More broadly, the example of the domain name dispute suggests that
government has a valuable though limited role to play in maintaining, through its
very background presence, the stability and authority of those few areas of the
Internet requiring centralized coordination. It also has a role in recognizing when
discussions about the Internet reflect substantive policy issues, rather than purely
technical issues, and stepping in to resolve conflicting interests that cannot be
legitimately settled under the standard-setting model of Internet governance.
Although the government should rightly be wary of stifling technical innovation
through ham-handed intervention, it should also be wary of being so pessimistic
about its ability to deal with technology that it abdicates too quickly its traditional
role in mediating differing substantive policy positions raised by technology.'66
Conversely, proponents of the decentralized, standard-setting model of Internet
governance also need to be aware of the limits of that model of coordination,
particularly when applied to issues that involve conflicting value and
distributional claims. Too often, government participation is viewed as all-or-
nothing. Yet a more nuanced and lighter involvement may be possible and even
desirable. With all of the anarchic rhetoric of the Internet, it is often easy to
forget that the very existence of the current Internet took place, not in a
government vacuum, but with substantial government funding and support. 67
It is also important to note that the government referred to is the U.S.
Government, and cannot purport to speak for other governments, who may have
legitimate claims over the generic domain name space. Thus, to the extent that
some modest government involvement may be necessary to facilitate Internet
165. To be sure, some questions may closely implicate both substantive policy and technical
standards, and in such cases we might envision some sort of closer interaction between the two
processes. Or, relatedly, there may be debates over when the standard-setting process has in
fact "failed."
166. Some might be concerned that government involvement in domain name issues might
make it more likely that the government would use such involvement to engage in other, more
intrusive, forms of regulation, such as over content. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 154. My
feeling is that such concerns are overstated. To the extent the government wishes to engage in
such regulation, it already has the available means to do so, and this background role in domain
name coordinators would add little to its existing power.
167. Johnson and Post argue that any single government will be unable to adequately exert
control over global domain name registration and that any attempt to do so amounts to an
"illegitimate extra-territorial power grab." Johnson & Post, supra note 4, at 1380. In my view,
this takes too literally the concept of Internet as a separate "space," and neglects the fact that
real-world institutions (e.g., TANA and NSI) in fact exert just this sort of control over the
domain name system. As previously discussed, real-world institutions currently control the
databases that coordinate the existing domain name system, and powerful network effects, as
a practical matter, prevent exit from the network.
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coordination, the generic top-level domains may need to be reconfigured to
account for at least this limitation in government authority. Thus, the ".com" and
".edu" domains may need to be expressly made parts of the ".us" top-level
domain.'68 This would be, at least on its surface, a dramatic change in the shape
of domain name space. Yet the simple addition of ".us" would merely recognize
the fact that many ".com" domains are located in the U.S. and the fact that the
U.S. Government has little legitimate claim to governing domain name space
outside its borders.'69 Coordination between governments may require that some
role be played by relevant international organizations, such as the United Nations
or the WIPO. 70
Such a limited government role is not inconsistent with the current
administration's concerns regarding leaving Internet development to the private
sector.' 7 ' Indeed, as the domain name problem has illustrated, premature
withdrawal of government support may not result in a flourishing of private sector
initiatives, but may instead result in substantial uncertainty and inefficiency.
Because of the difficulty of reaching consensus and the lack of clear authority,
lack of government involvement in a distributed network environment may not
result in freedom, but in paralysis and an inability to organize and actively pursue
the public good. Although the government is rightly aware of its limitations in
effectively predicting the course of technological development, it should also
recognize those few areas where a centralized coordinating role is necessary to
facilitate future development.
CONCLUSION
The domain name problem is unique in many ways, yet it may be a precursor
to future debates regarding technical standards. As the Internet becomes more and
more important in our daily lives, its methods of governance will come under
increasing scrutiny. Issues that were once purely technical may now have serious
distributional consequences. Conversely, issues that were once purely substantive
may soon have a large technical-standards component, as more and more Internet
regulation becomes written into the underlying code.'72 Take, for example, the
168. See Management of InternetNames and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,748 (1998)
(noting that "there is much opportunity for enlarging the .us domain space").
169. Moreover, future browsers might be configured simply to place a default term on the
end of a given address, depending on where you are located. Seen this way, the addition of
".us" to the end of a domain name is akin to the country code used to reach U.S. phone
numbers from abroad.
170. See Foster, supra note 55, at 201-06. "The United Nations and its specialized bodies
have a critical role to play in registering the Internet domain name system." Id. at 201.
171. See Summary of Comments, supra note 63 (summarizing comments submitted in
response to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration's ("NTIA")
RFC, and documenting the NTIA's position that "[tihe private sector, with input from
governments, should develol stable, consensus-based self-governing mechanisms for domain
name registration and management that adequately defines responsibilities and maintains
accountability").
172. See Post, supra note 4, 23 (treating network technical specifications as part of the
"law of cyberspace").
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discussions currently raging over standards for rating and filtering Internet
content, or over the addition of copyright management information.'
7 1
As the above analysis indicates, care will need to be taken to ensure that
adequate processes are in place to take into account the interests of the relevant
stakeholders. As the division between technical standards and law narrows, 7 we
may see a similar convergence in the processes for achieving such standards in
the future. More broadly, care should be taken in importing the dominant
standard-setting model of Internet coordination into other arenas. Unthinking use
of the standard-setting model, without an understanding of its underlying
assumptions, may result in the exclusion of parties who have a legitimate claim
to the process and, accordingly, a false "consensus." In many ways, the Internet
is quite exceptional, but it is important to keep in mind precisely what those ways
are.
173. See Lessig, Constitution of Code, supra note 86, at 183-84 (discussing other areas in
which the code regulates).
174. See id.; Lessig, Zones of Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 1408.
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